Defining Thamaniyya is the Key ?



It appears from the above synthesis of alternative views that the key issue seems to be a correct definition of thamaniyya. For instance, a fundamental question that leads to divergent positions on permissibility relates to whether thamaniyya is specific to gold and silver, or can be associated with anything that performs the functions of money. We raise some issues below which may be taken into account in any exercise in reconsideration of alternative positions.

It should be appreciated that thamaniyya may not be absolute and may vary in degrees. It is true that paper currencies have completely replaced gold and silver as medium of exchange, unit of account and store of value. In this sense, paper currencies can be said to possess thamaniyya. However, this is true for domestic currencies only and may not be true for foreign currencies. In other words, Indian rupees possess thamaniyya within the geographical boundaries of India only, and do not have any acceptability in US. These cannot be said to possess thamaniyya in US unless a US citizen can use Indian rupees as a medium of exchange, or unit of account, or store of value. In most cases such a possibility is remote. This possibility is also a function of the exchange rate mechanism in place, such as, convertibility of Indian rupees into US dollars, and whether a fixed or floating exchange rate system is in place. For example, assuming free convertibility of Indian rupees into US dollars and vice versa, and a fixed exchange rate system in which the rupee-dollar exchange rate is not expected to increase or decrease in the foreseeable future, thamaniyya of rupee in US is considerably improved. The example cited by Dr Nejatullah Siddiqui also appears quite robust under the circumstances. Permission to exchange rupees for dollars on a deferred basis (from one end, of course) at a rate different from the spot rate (official rate which is likely to remain fixed till the date of settlement) would be a clear case of interest-based borrowing and lending. However, if the assumption of fixed exchange rate is relaxed and the present system of fluctuating and volatile exchange rates is assumed to be the case, then it can be shown that the case of riba al-nasia breaks down. We rewrite his example: "In a given moment in time when the market rate of exchange between dollar and rupee is 1:20, if an individual purchases $50 at the rate of 1:22 (settlement of his obligation in rupees deferred to a future date), then it is highly probable that he is , in fact, borrowing Rs. 1000 now in lieu of a promise to repay Rs. 1100 on a specified later date. (Since, he can obtain Rs 1000 now, exchanging the $50 purchased on credit at spot rate)" This would be so, only if the currency risk is non-existent (exchange rate remains at 1:20), or is borne by the seller of dollars (buyer repays in rupees and not in dollars). If the former is true, then the seller of the dollars (lender) receives a predetermined return of ten percent when he converts Rs1100 received on the maturity date into $55 (at an exchange rate of 1:20). However, if the latter is true, then the return to the seller (or the lender) is not predetermined. It need not even be positive. For example, if the rupee-dollar exchange rate increases to 1:25, then the seller of dollar would receive only $44 (Rs 1100 converted into dollars) for his investment of $50.

Here two points are worth noting. First, when one assumes a fixed exchange rate regime, the distinction between currencies of different countries gets diluted. The situation becomes similar to exchanging pounds with sterlings (currencies belonging to the same country) at a fixed rate. Second, when one assumes a volatile exchange rate system, then just as one can visualize lending through the foreign currency market (mechanism suggested in the above example), one can also visualize lending through any other organized market (such as, for commodities or stocks.) If one replaces dollars for stocks in the above example, it would read as: "In a given moment in time when the market price of stock X is Rs 20, if an individual purchases 50 stocks at the rate of Rs 22 (settlement of his obligation in rupees deferred to a future date), then it is highly probable that he is , in fact, borrowing Rs. 1000 now in lieu of a promise to repay Rs. 1100 on a specified later date. (Since, he can obtain Rs 1000 now, exchanging the 50 stocks purchased on credit at current price)" In this case too as in the earlier example, returns to the seller of stocks may be negative if stock price rises to Rs 25 on the settlement date. Hence, just as returns in the stock market or commodity market are Islamically acceptable because of the price risk, so are returns in the currency market because of fluctuations in the prices of currencies.

A unique feature of thaman haqiqi or gold and silver is that the intrinsic worth of the currency is equal to its face value. Thus, the question of different geographical boundaries within which a given currency, such as, dinar or dirham circulates, is completely irrelevant. Gold is gold whether in country A or country B. Thus, when currency of country A made of gold is exchanged for currency of country B, also made of gold, then any deviation of the exchange rate from unity or deferment of settlement by either party cannot be permitted as it would clearly involve riba al-fadl and also riba al-nasia. However, when paper currencies of country A is exchanged for paper currency of country B, the case may be entirely different. The price risk (exchange rate risk), if positive, would eliminate any possibility of riba al-nasia in the exchange with deferred settlement. However, if price risk (exchange rate risk) is zero, then such exchange could be a source of riba al-nasia if deferred settlement is permitted7.

Another point that merits serious consideration is the possibility that certain currencies may possess thamaniyya, that is, used as a medium of exchange, unit of account, or store of value globally, within the domestic as well as foreign countries. For instance, US dollar is legal tender within US; it is also acceptable as a medium of exchange or unit of account for a large volume of transactions across the globe. Thus, this specific currency may be said to possesses thamaniyya globally, in which case, jurists may impose the relevant injunctions on exchanges involving this specific currency to prevent riba al-nasia. The fact is that when a currency possesses thamaniyya globally, then economic units using this global currency as the medium of exchange, unit of account or store of value may not be concerned about risk arising from volatility of inter-country exchange rates. At the same time, it should be recognized that a large majority of currencies do not perform the functions of money except within their national boundaries where these are legal tender.

Riba and risk cannot coexist in the same contract. The former connotes a possibility of returns with zero risk and cannot be earned through a market with positive price risk. As has been discussed above, the possibility of riba al-fadl or riba al-nasia may arise in exchange when gold or silver function as thaman; or when the exchange involves paper currencies belonging to the same country; or when the exchange involves currencies of different countries following a fixed exchange rate system. The last possibility is perhaps unIslamic8 since price or exchange rate of currencies should be allowed to fluctuate freely in line with changes in demand and supply and also because prices should reflect the intrinsic worth or purchasing power of currencies. The foreign currency markets of today are characterised by volatile exchange rates. The gains or losses made on any transaction in currencies of different countries, are justified by the risk borne by the parties to the contract.

2.1.4. Possibility of Riba with Futures and Forwards

So far, we have discussed views on the permissibility of bai salam in currencies, that is, when the obligation of only one of the parties to the exchange is deferred. What are the views of scholars on deferment of obligations of both parties ? Typical example of such contracts are forwards and futures9. According to a large majority of scholars, this is not permissible on various grounds, the most important being the element of risk and uncertainty (gharar) and the possibility of speculation of a kind which is not permissible. This is discussed in section 3. However, another ground for rejecting such contracts may be riba prohibition. In the preceding paragraph we have discussed that bai salam in currencies with fluctuating exchange rates can not be used to earn riba because of the presence of currency risk. It is possible to demonstrate that currency risk can be hedged or reduced to zero with another forward contract transacted simultaneously. And once risk is eliminated, the gain clearly would be riba.

We modify and rewrite the same example: "In a given moment in time when the market rate of exchange between dollar and rupee is 1:20, an individual purchases $50 at the rate of 1:22 (settlement of his obligation in rupees deferred to a future date), and the seller of dollars also hedges his position by entering into a forward contract to sell Rs1100 to be received on the future date at a rate of 1:20, then it is highly probable that he is , in fact, borrowing Rs. 1000 now in lieu of a promise to repay Rs. 1100 on a specified later date. (Since, he can obtain Rs 1000 now, exchanging the 50 dollars purchased on credit at spot rate)" The seller of the dollars (lender) receives a predetermined return of ten percent when he converts Rs1100 received on the maturity date into 55 dollars (at an exchange rate of 1:20) for his investment of 50 dollars irrespective of the market rate of exchange prevailing on the date of maturity.

Another simple possible way to earn riba may even involve a spot transaction and a simultaneous forward transaction. For example, the individual in the above example purchases $50 on a spot basis at the rate of 1:20 and simultaneously enters into a forward contract with the same party to sell $50 at the rate of 1:21 after one month. In effect this implies that he is lending Rs1000 now to the seller of dollars for one month and earns an interest of Rs50 (he receives Rs1050 after one month. This is a typical buy-back or repo (repurchase) transaction so common in conventional banking.10


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